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 The First Amendment is a living right used by all persons in the United States. 
Such practices of the first clause in Article I are decided as protected or 
unprotected by the Supreme Court. Justice Holmes in United States v. 
Schwimmer eloquently described the nature of the First Amendment in his 
dissent: “Not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the 
thought that we hate.”1 In contemporary times the practice of free speech exists 
on the Internet. The intent of speakers is effectively hidden through text and 
accordingly poses major problems for people to dinstinguish threats from 
passionate speech. There are people who would exploit the safeguard of free 
speech in a way that is most detrimental not only to society, but to all of the 
scholars that have proclaimed its value. It is natural that in the course of our 
nation’s history, the Supreme Court would eventually come to the question of 
what limitations there can be to free speech. Unlike protected speech, speech that 
engenders the breach of peace, incites havoc in a polity, or undermines the 
process of justice has no place in American society and serves no value of the 
fundamental principles of the First Amendment. The Stone Court established 
precedent for such relevant free speech questions. In Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, Justice Murphy established a two-tier theory. This theory categorized 
unprotected forms of speech which “contributed to the expression of ideas or 
possessed any social value in the search for truth.”2 While Murphy’s opinion in 
Chaplinsky did not refer to “true threats,” his very words would be the precursor 
for cases to come regarding communicated threats. The government is given 
capacity by Title 18 of United States Code § 875 (c) to prosecute based on 
threatening content within speech:  
  
Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce 
any communication containing any threat to kidnap any 
person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both.3   
  
                                               
1 Holmes, J. (Concurring) United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).  
2 “There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include 
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words -- those 
which, by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.  It 
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and 
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Emphasis added. Murphy, J. 
(Opinion). Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  
3 Title 18, U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 41 §875 (c).  
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The crux of the modern-day argument over whether the qualifying factor for 
determining a “threat” is based on the judicial balancing tests known as 
subjective and objective intent. For the government, it is easy to find criminal 
culpability with objective intent. It has to be proven that the communicated 
message was sent and had the ramifications of a threat.4 To reliably prove that 
such a statement was intended to be a threat, it is imperative to understand the 
applicable level of mens rea. Mens rea is the legal element that determines the 
state of mind of the person who committed a crime. The degree of mens rea for 
the one who communicated an alleged threat is at the level of criminal 
negligence. The Model Penal Code clarifies criminal negligence to equate 
something that a “reasonable” person would consider substantial and unjustifiable 
risk[s] that their conduct would lead to a prohibited result.5 For subjective intent, 
the one who uttered the speech in question must show what they intended for the 
communicated message to be, and as such, requires purposeful culpability of 
mens rea.6 For the government, this is harder to prove because the burden lies on 
them to prove that there was specific intent to threaten as opposed to the 
consequences of the message. The lack of unity among circuit courts in their 
methodology answering individual cases pertaining to true threats was stemmed 
by Justice O'Connor's opinion of Virginia v. Black. Precisely, Justice O’Connor 
stated:  
  
True threats encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of 
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals. The 
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.7  
  
She continued:  
  
Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of 
the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs 
a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent 
of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.8  
  
                                               
4 In the course of this paper the types of objective tests will be explained, but in how they related 
to criminal negligence is in the respect that the speaker understands that they uttered a threat.   
5 Model Penal Code §2.02 - General Requirements of Culpability, (2), Negligence.  
6 Model Penal Code §2.02 - General Requirements of Culpability, (2), Purposeful.  
7 O’Connor, J., (Opinion). Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 (2003)  
8 Ibid.  
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black has ushered legal scholars and 
lower court justices alike towards an ambiguous method on proving the intent of 
a threat. As will later be elaborated, it is of utmost importance for the government 
to determine which balancing test of intent is in line with the principles of the 
First Amendment. Unchecked by circuit courts, there is a bridge between the 
application of the test and the constitutionality of the test. To remedy such an 
issue, the Supreme Court must resolve the free speech issues from governmental 
efforts to limit threats posted on social media sites such as Facebook.  Once these 
issues are resolved, the government can then lawfully limit threats on the 
Internet. Such free speech questions the government will ask itself include: Are 
true threats protected under the First Amendment? More importantly, which test 
for intent is the proper channel to prosecute “true threats” under 18 U.S. Code 
§875(c)?  
 
  The first question asked is one which can be more easily resolved, given 
prior precedent set by federal courts. It is not new for courts to acknowledge that 
there are certain types of unprotected speech. The very fact that there still exists 
federal statutes l that prohibit threats within communication across interstate 
commerce is evidence of such basic constitutional understanding. A challenge on 
the face of legislation can be made as to whether or not it is constitutional, but 
among the differing approaches by the circuit courts, it is well agreed that such 
an argument falls short unless there is proof of real and substantial overbreadth.9 
All previous judicial thought on how courts would approach an argument against 
“true threats” does so in a systematic fashion— every decision pertaining to 
unprotected forms of speech starts from Chaplinsky—the observation that there 
are utterances that are not any essential part in the exchange of thought and have 
no social value.10 While Justice Murphy applied it to fighting words and added to 
his opinion the obscene, the profane, and the libelous, this is what gave breath to 
the start of the constitutional limits of speech. This separation would become 
more substantive with the decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, where it held 
against content-based discrimination ordinances and the proscribable threat of 
certain messages. Stated in Blackmun’s concurring opinion, “threats are outside 
the First Amendment to protect individuals from the fear of violence, from the 
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened 
                                               
9 “I do not deny this possibility, but to prevail in a facial challenge, it is not enough for a plaintiff 
to show "some" overbreadth. Our cases require a proof of "real" and "substantial" overbreadth, 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)...  but which nonetheless has some redeeming 
value for minors or does not appeal to their prurient interest--is a very small one.” O’Connor, J., 
(Concurring). Reno v American Civil Liberties Union 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
10 Murphy, J. (Opinion). Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  
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violence will occur."11 The Ninth Circuit deliberated further upon Blackmun’s 
opinion from R.A.V. in Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life 
Activists:  
  
This purpose is not served by hinging constitutionality 
on the speaker's subjective intent or capacity to do (or 
not to do) harm. Rather, these factors go to how 
reasonably foreseeable it is to a speaker that the listener 
will seriously take his communication as an intent to 
inflict bodily harm. This suffices to distinguish a "true 
threat" from speech that is merely frightening. Thus, no 
reasonable speaker would foresee that a patient would 
take the statement "You have cancer and will die within 
six months," or that a pedestrian would take a warning 
"Get out of the way of that bus," as a serious expression 
of intent to inflict bodily harm; the harm is going to 
happen anyway.12  
  
For many reasons the federal judicial branch does believe in this separation of 
pure speech from unprotected speech. Starting from Chaplinsky, it has only 
become more refined through time in later cases which further describe the 
relationship of pure speech to the idea of “true threats.” As such, the foundation 
is laid for the judicial recognition of true threats on the Internet which the 
government wishes to limit.  
 
  With two foundational questions presented, the judicial history of true 
threats must first be made known. To begin, one must look at the case of Virginia 
v. Black. Black was unique in the respect that it is one of the few court cases that 
helped to establish a definition of true threats. Cited previously, O’Connor 
decided with a mere one sentence (as opposed to the extensive discourse on true 
threats given by the Ninth Court in their decision of Planned Parenthood) that 
the definition was a serious communicated message expressing the intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals. It is not the first time the courts have used the terms “intend” or 
“intent.” In a case decided by the Tenth Circuit four years prior to the decision in 
Black, they deliberated upon United States v. Viefhaus, which involved the family 
of James Dodson Viefhaus and his fiancée. The couple maintained a hotline that 
broadcasted messages as the “Aryan Intelligence Network.” Only those who 
                                               
11 Blackmun, J., (Concurring). R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).   
12 Rymer, J. (Opinion) Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition for Life Activists, 290 F.3d 
1058 (2002).  
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called to leave a message on the hotline and listened in could hear some of the 
threatening content they expressed. The respondent was prosecuted under a 
violation of 18 U.S. Code §844(c).13 He appealed his conviction, claiming that 
his message was not a true threat, but rather political speech and should follow 
prior court precedent in Watts v. United States.14 In Watts the Stone Court sought 
to answer whether or not the petitioner’s speech in question was political speech 
or a true threat in relation to 18 U.S.C §871(a).15 It was found to be hyperbolic 
because he uttered a conditional—if it could not be interpreted as a true threat, 
but as political speech. Furthermore, in Watts it was held that a statute which 
punishes threatening speech is constitutional on its face. 16 Through Viefhaus, the 
Tenth Circuit defined a true threat as a “declaration of intention, purpose, design, 
goal, or determination to inflict punishment, loss, or pain on another, or to injure 
another or his property by the commission of some unlawful act.”17 In Planned 
Parenthood, Justice Berzon further described that true threats are not required to 
                                               
13 Viefhaus was indicted on one count of using a telephone to transmit a bomb threat, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e): “Whoever, through the use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, or other 
instrument of interstate or foreign commerce, or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, 
willfully makes any threat, or maliciously conveys false information knowing the same to be 
false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made, or to be made, to kill, injure, or 
intimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or other real 
or personal property by means of fire or an explosive shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 
years or fined under this title, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 844(e).  
14 The holding to the legal question, “Was Watt’s statement a legitimate threat within the meaning 
of 18 U.S.C.  
§871(a). The court concluded: The language of the political arena… is often vituperative, abusive, 
and inexact. Thus, considering the context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the 
statement and the reaction of the listeners, the Court ruled that Watts' statement was not a true 
threat. (Per curiam). Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705  (1969). The Oyez Project at IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law.    
15 Whoever knowingly and wilfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery from any 
post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document 
containing any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of 
the United States[...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. §871(a). 
16 “Certainly the statute under which petitioner was convicted is constitutional on its face. The 
Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its 
Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without interference from threats of 
physical violence.” (Per curiam). Watts v. United States 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
17 Emphasis added, Briscoe, J (Opinion).. United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 
1999).  
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have an element of imminence of danger.18 What matters most is the conscious 
intent to carry out the expressed threat. As questions regarding true threats are 
examined, the first question can be answered. However, one underlying issue is 
still discernible: true threats have yet to be well defined and narrowly classified. 
The cases examined later will resolve this issue granted that the government is 
allowed to limit true threats for they are a form of unprotected speech.  
  
  To that end, the second question must be addressed: Which test for intent 
is the proper channel to prosecute “true threats” under U.S. Code §875 (c)? There 
is a clear gap of understanding between the Supreme Court and circuit courts on 
defining a true threat. Black is often inaccurately regarded as a case which strictly 
covered true threats. There is a deeper component within the case that is 
overlooked. Black did not seek to define a true threat, but rather to claim an 
analytical formula for the means of lawfully suppressing forms of symbolic 
speech. To reiterate: Black’s focus is not on the definition of a true threat, but 
rather analyzing discrimination based on Black sought to give the tools to guide 
justices through the proper channel in deciding what content discrimination is 
and what it isn’t. In this regard it is analogous to the guideline established in a 
previous case, Feiner v. New York. Feiner held that speech can be 
constitutionally limited by the reaction it receives when the officers arrests 
someone on a content-neutral rule. Connecting to Feiner, speech can be 
constitutionally limited if the suppression is found to be content neutral 
regardless of the intent of the speaker.19Conversely, in Black tells us the opposite 
for symbolic speech— if the demonstration in question (specifically in Black it 
was cross-burning) can be proven with a specific intent such as intimidation, the 
state can rightfully suppress it. Given this observation, Black and Feiner together 
establish a framework for determining true threats. The federal statute that limits 
threats does not dissect the content of the threat, but whether or not a threat is 
being uttered. Interpreting Black by itself limits the classification of a true threat 
and as a result of this, the circuit courts have composed their own interpretation 
of the type of objective test that should be used to determine intent within a 
threat. These tests can be categorized as such: The reasonable-speaker test, the 
reasonable-hearer test, and the objective neutral approach. In United States v. 
Fulmer, the First Circuit adopted its objective test that focused on the reasonable 
speaker:  
  
                                               
18 “... although the majority opinion is less clear on this point — I would, where true threats are 
alleged, not require a finding of immediacy of the threatened harm. Berzon, J,. (Dissenting) 
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition for Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (2002) 
19It is implied from this that a cause of suppressing speech in a content neutral fashion stems from 
keep society in order.  
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We believe that the appropriate standard under which a 
defendant may be convicted for making a threat is 
whether he should have reasonably foreseen that the 
statement he uttered would be taken as a threat by those 
to whom it is [sic] made. This standard not only takes 
into account the factual context in which the statement 
was made, but also better avoids the perils that inhere in 
the "reasonable-recipient standard," namely that the jury 
will consider the unique sensitivity of the recipient. We 
find it particularly untenable that, were we apply a 
standard guided from the perspective of the recipient, a 
defendant may be convicted for making an ambiguous 
statement that the recipient may find threatening 
because of events not within the knowledge of the 
defendant.20  
  
This case followed the prosecution of the respondent Kevan Fulmer for 
threatening a federal agent. Fulmer had close contact with an FBI agent, Richard 
Egan, after Fulmer reported that his family was committing tax fraud.21 The FBI 
agent looked into his case and found no evidence as such and had no grounds to 
prosecute his family.22 Fulmer protested the decision in response. Shortly after 
Fulmer left the FBI agent, he sent a threatening message to him and the agent 
thought it was a threat.23 The court arrived at a conclusion affirming the 
petitioner’s case and thus set precedent for the reasonable-speaker test of the First 
Circuit. In a distinguishing manner, a separate circuit court established the 
reasonable-recipient test.24 The reasonable-recipient test was established in the 
Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Dinwiddie:  
  
Although the government may outlaw threats, the First 
Amendment does not permit the government to punish 
speech merely because the speech is forceful or 
aggressive. What is offensive to some is passionate to 
others. The First Amendment, therefore, requires a court 
(or a jury) that is applying FACE's prohibition on using 
“threats of force,” to differentiate between “true 
threat[s], and protected speech. The court must analyze 
                                               
20 Torruella, J., (Opinion). United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997)  
21 United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 
1491 (1st Cir. 1997)  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Synonymous with “reasonable speaker test”  
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an alleged threat “in the light of [its] entire factual 
context, and decide whether the recipient of the alleged 
threat could reasonably conclude that it expresses “a 
determination or intent to injure presently or in the 
future.”25   
  
The Eighth Circuit then later established this precedent:  
  
When determining whether statements have constituted 
threats of force, we have considered a number of 
factors: the reaction of the recipient of the threat and of 
other listeners, whether the threat was conditional, 
whether the threat was communicated directly to its 
victim, whether the maker of the threat had made similar 
statements to the victim in the past, and whether the 
victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threat 
had a propensity to engage in violence. This list is not 
exhaustive, and the presence or absence of any one of its 
elements need not be dispositive.26  
  
In a decision the Eighth Court, the First Amendment was short shrifted when the 
court applied a form of speech and determined the intent based on the listener’s 
reaction.27 As a result, their test fundamentally goes against the First 
Amendment. Such an objective-subjective test based on whether or not the 
listener found it to be offensive avoids the consideration of the speaker’s intent 
whatsoever. The last test to determine intent was adopted by the Fifth Circuit.28 
In the case of United States v. Morales, the court applied a two-factor test: A 
threat is knowingly made if the speaker comprehends the meaning of the words 
he utters and if the speaker voluntarily speaks the words with the intent to carry 
out the threat.29 It made no difference whether Morales communicated the threat 
to the school itself or to a third party, only the character and context of the threat 
are relevant. These objective tests all establish a low level of mens rea on the 
                                               
25 Citations omitted. United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996)  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 It is imperative to note that all three examples of these tests are interpretations by the circuit 
courts. Every court has dealt with a case pertaining to true threats and they predominantly use 
one objective test out of the three. 
29 The respondent was an eighteen year old high school student. He made threatening messages on 
the internet stating he was going to kill teachers and students at Milby High School in Houston. 
He was arrested and convicted of one count of transmitting a threat to injure another in violation 
of 18 U.S. Code §875(c).   
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speaker. Since the speaker must only know of the effect his utterance had, there is 
only a level of criminal negligence, giving the prosecutors a low level of 
culpability to prove.  
  
  Now that the objective intent to threaten test and all its derivations have 
been explained, the other test to determine intent has to be examined. Both 
Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court have rarely used the subjective test for 
intent to determine culpability. The subjective test differs from the objective test 
in two ways. The first is where the emphasis of intent is placed: For the objective 
standard the intent is placed on the speaker that could foresee the statement being 
interpreted as a threat. The subjective standard’s intent is placed on the speaker. 
The statement in question is deemed as a threat if the speaker specifically 
intended to have his messaged be conveyed in a threatening manner. In addition, 
the other distinction is that subjective intent has an innately higher degree of 
mens rea. With criminal negligence or recklessness being assigned to objective 
intent, subjective intent requires the speaker to be engaged in the conduct and 
hoping to act upon the actions being spoken. Because of this higher degree of 
mens rea, there is a higher bar for the government to prosecute someone who 
makes a threat. In lower circuit court Justice Wright’s dissent in Watts, he 
disagreed with the application of Ragansky and argued that the government 
should have to prove that the defendant intended to carry out the threat. 30 
Specifically, the application of Ragansky is by two factors: that the uttered threat 
is knowingly made by the speaker and that the speaker wilfully uttered the 
words.31 When the case was brought to the Supreme Court, it was determined 
that Watts’ threats constituted political speech. He was consequently let go 
because political speech is protected under the First Amendment.  Joined by 
Justice Douglas in the case of Rogers v. United States, Justice Marshall stated that 
“the statute had to be read in a fashion that all threats that the speakers intends to 
be interpreted as expressions of an intent to kill or injure the President ought to 
be proscribable.”32 Marshall evoked the concept of the subjective intent— it is 
not whether or not the threat made should be taken reasonably as something that 
                                               
30 This is in essence the application of Ragansky. For a comprehensive articulation of the 
Ragansky approach see: Principe, Craig, Matthew. "What Were They Thinking?: Competing 
Culpability Standards For Punishing Threats Made To The President. Volume 7, Issue 2, (2012)  
31 Ibid. 
32 “Because § 871 was intended to prevent not simply attempts on the President's life, but also the 
harm associated with the threat itself, I believe that the statute should be construed to proscribe all 
threats that the speaker intends to be interpreted as expressions of an intent to kill or injure the 
President. This construction requires proof that the defendant intended to make a threatening 
statement, and that the statement he made was, in fact, threatening in nature.” Marshall, J., 
(Dissenting). Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975)  
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would be done by the person, the listener, or within context, but more importantly 
that the speaker himself intends for the communication to be made as a threat.33  
  
  The last question will decide for the courts which test is most appropriate 
to prove intent. The objective test, while absolutely stringent in its applicability, 
has a chilling effect to it. Justice Berzon described the chilling effect in his 
dissent of Planned Parenthood:   
  
The First Amendment protects advocacy statements that 
are likely to produce imminent violent action, so long as 
the statements are not directed at producing such action. 
To do so otherwise would be to endanger the First 
Amendment protection accorded advocacy of political 
change by holding speakers responsible for an impact 
they did not intend.34  
  
Berzon’s examination undertook the necessary test to apply the First 
Amendment’s tenets to the question of whether statements in the case could be 
protected even if they are likely to produce imminent violent action, contrasting 
with other analyses by other circuit justices. The use of the objective test as the 
prevailing measure that courts apply not only stops criminals, but stifles future 
speech demonstration by activists in fear of arrest when they hold innocent 
intentions. If the objective test were to be applied to free speech cases pertaining 
to the Internet, the objective test would act as a sensitive trigger to determine 
criminal culpability for everyone who uses passionate words.  
 
While these court decisions pertaining to true threats at the circuit level 
came before Black, Black has done nothing to clarify lower courts which test to 
determine a true threat is best. The lack of a proper definition in the opinion 
allows for prior circuit precedent to persist. By extension, the usage of the 
objective intent tests among the circuit courts does not necessarily proscribe true 
threats because it does not examine the concept of personal agency to speak. The 
underlying fault of the objective intent to determine a true threat is that it deviates 
from a principle that the intent of speech is not determined through personal 
agency but the reaction that it receives. There has been no similar test that 
determines the meaning of one’s own words held in any other First Amendment 
case. Speech is a means of communicating a purposely intended message. In this 
light, the subjective test respects that personal liberty. It is what allows one to 
                                               
33 Marshall, J., (Dissenting). Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975)  
34 Emphasis added. Berzon, J., (Dissenting) Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition for Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (2002)  
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differentiate the statement of a comedian making a crass joke from that of a man 
with criminal intent to harm another individual. What the subjective test fails to 
take into consideration, though, is how the words are to be received, similar to 
what is found in Feiner. Feiner’s incapacitation was from the emotions 
engendered by his speech and not its content. Consequently, the subjective test is 
questionable in modern times because it does not weigh the explicit words with 
the intent of the speaker as it applies to the Internet. Because of both tests’ 
shortcomings, the courts must decide the determining test of intent in a manner 
that combines the factors of intent and the effect of speech. A new standard ought 
to be established by the Supreme Court for determining intent that is decided 
with a rational mentality analogous to the Fourth Amendment case called Illinois 
v. Gates. In respect to threats posted on the Internet, the proper method to 
determine intent is to consolidate the subjective and objective tests, and utilize 
the combination as a standard that allows justices and juries to determine intent 
based on the “totality of all factors,”35 namely the speaker’s intent, and the 
rational interpretation of the text in question. It is only possible to prosecute if 
both of these factors are present. This new standard is the true determining factor 
that the government must use to prosecute someone under 18 U.S.C§873(c). With 
this standard, governmental efforts to limit threats are within the First 
Amendment by not overstepping the intent of speaker who types passionate text 
on the Internet. 
  
  Not only have the two questions been resolved, but there is a resolution to 
the long disputed standard for determining intent. The lack of clarity in Black has 
only brought ambiguity to the determination of true threats. Because Black 
brought ambiguity to future relevant cases, circuit courts concluded on separate 
forms of an objective-based test The Supreme Court must now determine that the 
only acceptable method of determining intent is with this new test that takes into 
account the whole situation. By weighing in on the intent of the speaker and 
taking into consideration the literal utterance of threats, the Court can decide on 
the constitutional limit that government has in limiting threats on the Internet.36 
Thus this standard is similar to the spirit of determining probable cause as it was 
in Gates. Furthermore, this test follows the nature of why such a test ought to be 
valued: It moves away from a hyper-technical analysis of determination to its 
respective reason to undergo a test.37 For Gates it was to determine probable 
                                               
35 The phrasing of this sentence is purposely constructed as the language of the 
opinion in Gates. 
36 And by extension, all forms of interstate commerce. 
37 An allusion to the wording of Rehnquist’s opinion of Gates. “A grudging or negative attitude 
by reviewing courts toward warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong 
preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; "courts should not invalidate warrants 
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cause, while for “true threats” it is for determining intent.38 Moreover, such a 
standard as described allows for users on the Internet to make passionate 
statements without unintentionally stepping into a legal quagmire on 
determination of intent. By removing the chilling factor of the objective test, the 
government can limit true threats that are made with the intent to harm others and 
in the same standard can differentiate such violent persons from those who are 
innocent. Under these reasons, this test is established in such a way that it 
respects the personal connection of one’s will to speak out to the freedom of 
speech. With the modern world being connected through the Internet, this 
standard can respect old observances of free speech. To quote Justice Thurgood 
Marshall from one court case, “freedom of speech serves not only the needs of 
the polity, but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
expression. Such expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a 
sense of identity. To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for 
recognition and affront the individual's worth and dignity.”39 The government 
must recognize that the First Amendment is always being applied on the Internet 
before they push efforts to limit threats on Facebook. In hope that this is 
observed, the breadth of which free speech can thrive is not undermined while 
also protecting society from those who truly intend to harm individuals. Once the 
government properly balances the relationship between the free exercise of 
speech with a proper test of intent to determine intent, they can limit threats 
within their constitutional boundary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                                                                                                
by interpreting affidavits in a hypertechnical, rather than a common sense, manner." Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).  
38 The Aguilar-Spinelli test only obstructed magistrates.  By abandoning it magistrates are able to 
deal with the facts on individuals cases in a reasonable fashion to determine probable cause. In 
that respect, the totality of circumstances for probable cause is like this test for intent:  It looks at 
the case in the respect of taking into thought what the intent of the speaker is and the effect it has 
on society. It does needs not to take into account other similar cases or following a strict test, but 
rather observe the two factors, intent and effect, to determine if the threat is true or not.   
39 Marshall, J., (Concurring in Part II). Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).  
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